The Iraq War is a deal breaker

Has the official Iraq War narrative become, “the surge has worked?”  Since that’s really the only way to explain why this Time writer unquestionably accepts President Bush’s assertion that the surge has been successful:

On his grand tour of the Middle East, George Bush was far away from the ground wars of the U.S. presidential campaign. Indeed, thanks to the success of the U.S. military surge, the war he started in Iraq is now a second-tier issue in American politics. But Iraq may become a resurgent factor in the strategies of those who want to succeed him in office. The “good news” of the surge and tentative steps forward in Iraqi internal politics may weigh on how voters view the politicians maneuvering to become the next President of the United States.

From what I’ve read at least, the impact of the surge is still up for debate.  Here’s Robert Farley on the surge:

When we’re evaluating the Surge as policy, we have to remember that it should be evaluated as a whole, not solely on its October effects. The Surge began in February, and its execution resulted in an enormous increase in violence that lasted until about June. The Surge has thus resulted in the bloodiest year for the Coalition in Iraq thus far, despite the fact that a month and a half are still left in the year. Even if we allow that the Surge has had a positive impact on violence in the second half of 2007, you cannot separate out the two phenomenon; the increase in violence was a necessary consequence of the strategy employed, and the surge must be evaluated on that basis. If violence in Iraq remains at its current low level, the Surge may eventually pay off in terms of US casualties, but it has failed to do so thus far.

………….

To the extent the Surge and the associated strategy of tribal alliances has succeeded militarily, it has undercut the political justification for the war and undermined the exit strategy. We are now farther away from having a capable, centralized Iraqi state than we have ever been. Even in 2003 and 2004, there was potential that a state might have been constructed that could govern Iraq. Now, in a process that US military authorities have more or less acknowledged, the central national government has become essentially irrelevant. The tribal strategy has cut violence, but it has also, by privileging substate actors, substantially eliminated the prospect of a democratic, unified Iraq. The Iraq we see today is utterly prostrate, completely incapable of defending itself from any outside actor with anything other than a guerilla strategy. It has no air force, no significant armored formations, no navy to speak of, and no unified military command capable of developing long range defense plans. The central government does not control its own territory, in the sense that it utterly lacks a monopoly on legitimate (not to mention illegitimate) violence. It’s also worth mentioning that the actors we’re currently enabling represent the most reactionary, anti-democratic elements in Iraqi life. Indeed, it’s unclear which of the Sunni militias or the Shia government has less of an interest in Western conceptions of democracy.

I recommend reading the whole thing.  Farley takes a decidedly pessimistic view of the surge, and I’m inclined to think he’s right in doing so.  Violence in Iraq fell only to 2005 levels, but it’s unclear whether that is a product of the surge or a result of successful ethnic cleansing in Baghdad.  More importantly, Iraqis are no closer to a political solution now then they were a year ago, when the surge began (and finding a political solution, if you remember, was the entire point of the surge). 

If the jury is still out on the success of the surge, than what reason would the Time reporter have for reporting the surge as a success?  If you read the article in full, then it seems like he’s more concern with talking about the political ramifications of the surge than he is with actual conditions on the ground in Iraq.  Which, truth be told, are a hell of a lot more important than minor political advantages certain politicians may gain.

For what it’s worth though, I think that a candidate’s position on the Iraq War (at the beginning and now) should be the deciding factor in who gets the nomination.  It is one thing to be on the wrong side of a minor policy dispute, it’s something entirely different to be on the wrong side of the greatest strategic blunder in American history.  Especially when there was more than enough information available to show that the war would be a disaster.

Barack Obama has repeatedly stressed his early opposition to the Iraq War, and even though he wasn’t in the Senate to act on said opposition, he was in a tough primary race for the Senate nomination and his public opposition to the war could have been used against him.  I think he deserves some credit for his stance.

John Edwards voted for the war in a moment of political cowardice, but in the last few years, has become a staunch opponent of the war  and has publicly apologized for his vote.  He deserves credit not just for admitting his mistake, but also attacking the entire premise of the Iraq War and challenging the “war on terror” frame.  I don’t think his foreign policy instincts are as progressive as Obama’s, but they’ve certainly improved.

Which is more than can be said for Hillary Clinton.  Clinton was a staunch supporter of the war at its beginning.  Some of her supporters have tried to excuse her support by claiming that she was pressured to vote for the war for political reasons.  If that’s true, then it points to Clinton as someone who is more concerned with her political appearance than she is with the interests of the country.  Personally, I think Hillary Clinton supported the war on its merits, and is opposed only to its execution.  There is every reason to think that Clinton is a committed hawk: she refuses to apologize for her Iraq War vote, she supports the Bush administration’s Iran saber-rattling, and she has surrounded herself with hawkish foreign policy advisors who also supported the Iraq War.

When push comes to shove, Clinton seems more interested in maintaining some adolescent aura of “toughness” than she is with finding a real solution.  A quick glance at American foreign policy history should show that an over-reliance on military force is foolish and counter-productive.  Her support for the Iraq War (and refusal to acknowledge it as a mistake) fingers her as someone who doesn’t understand that fact.

That alone should disqualify her for the nomination.  What the United States needs is a measured, cautious and humble approach to the international community, not a fat-free neoconservatism.

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