Thanks Jeffrey Goldberg, this is the most impressive bit of fear-mongering I’ve seen in a long time:
But at yesterday’s Aspen panel on nuclear non-proliferation, the general consensus was that there’s a reasonably high likelihood that a nuclear device will be detonated in an American city, New York or Washington most likely, at some point in the next ten years. And the experts on the panel, John Holdren and Joe Cirincione among them, are not exactly attached to the Bush Administration worldview. After such an attack, we’ll look back — those of us still around, obviously — on our efforts to combat al Qaeda and judge them inadequate to the task, just as we look back now on the Clinton Administration’s pre-9/11 preparations (and the Bush Administration’s, as well) as thoroughly inadequate. So I suppose I’m convinced of two things simultaneously: Al Qaeda is fairly weak, and not very popular at all, and that this might not matter as much as people think.
I’ve mentioned to friends that I hate the word “reasonably” when used this way. Why? Because it doesn’t tell you a damned thing about the claim being made. What exactly is a “reasonably high likelihood?” Is it a fifty percent or a five percent chance? Is it relative to other events, or is it an objective likelihood? And even if we knew what a “reasonably high likelihood” is, how is he defining a nuclear device? Does he mean an actual nuclear weapon, or a dirty bomb (which is simply a regular bomb packed with radioactive material)? If he means the former, then he’s moved out of the “reality-based community” and into the realm of fiction. 24 and The Sum of All Fears aside, the odds of a nuclear detonation in the United States are extremely small. And it has almost entirely to do with the logistics of actually obtaining and transporting a nuclear weapon.
A well-funded terrorist group has three options for obtaining a nuclear device: the black market, a “rogue state,” and the DIY option. Now, the last option is so outlandish as to warrant immediate dismissal. Unless we’re talking about Cobra here (and they aren’t nearly competent enough to pull it off), it’s extremely unlikely that any terrorist group - no matter how well-funded - could find the time, manpower and expertise necessary to build a nuclear device from scratch (as the link details, the smallest nuclear weapon program - South Africa’s - required $1 billion, 400 people, and twenty years). That leaves us with the first two options, both of which are only marginally more realistic. You count the number of nuclear weapon states on two hands, and of those, North Korea and Pakistan are the obvious candidates for “most likely to hand out WMDs like candy.” Except, even the craziest leaders aren’t so irrational as to just hand out nuclear weapons to terrorists. Not just because they are just as liable to be targets as anyone else, but also because in the event of a nuclear terrorist attack, the United States (and just about everyone else) will immediately suspect - and likely retaliate against - the country who seems guilty. I don’t think there’s a single leader on this planet who would risk losing everything for - in the long run - such a small “pleasure.”
Now, as far as the black market is concerned, it’s probably possible for a well-funded group to just buy a nuclear device. And most likely, it would be a tactical nuclear weapon designed for battlefield use. They are plentiful (the Soviet Union deployed as many as 4,000) and not terribly secure. Unfortunately for our would-be terrorists, they are also extremely heavy and cumbersome, making it extremely difficult - if not impossible - to smuggle (the same goes for a nuclear weapon “donated” by a rogue state, chances are that it would be a crude, several thousand pound monstrosity).
“But,” you yell, “what about suitcase nukes! Those are portable and easy to conceal, making them perfect for terrorist use.”
Again, lay off of the bad action movies. Contrary to the claims of a Yeltsin-era Russian official , there is a fair amount of evidence to suggest that there aren’t a couple hundred “suitcase nukes” just floating around on the black market. And even if there were, it’s unlikely that they would be any more dangerous than a conventional explosion (of course, there would be radiation to worry about). According to a 2006 report released by the London Institute for Strategic Studies, the smallest nuclear weapon in existence had more bark than bite:
The smallest nuclear weapon known to have been built by the US was a plutonium device measuring 26.4cm by 38.5cm and weighing around 22.8kg. Yield was proportionately low: between 0.01 and 0.25 kilotons (at most, 140th the force of the Hiroshima bomb).
In fairness to Goldberg though, there is the possibility of a dirty bomb being detonated in a major American city. In 2005, a group of security experts concluded that there was a 40 percent chance of such an attack:
The survey of arms control and national security experts also indicated there is a 30 percent chance there will be a major chemical or biological attack, Lugar said in a prepared statement released June 24.
“The prospects of a dirty bomb attack were pegged at 40 percent,” he said. A dirty bomb is a high explosive that has been contaminated with radioactive materials.
The study surveyed 85 senior international scholars, policy-makers, diplomats, and technicians on the spread of dangerous weapons and international responses to the growing problem.
Outside of the initial explosion though, the effects wouldn’t be particularly devastating:
A dirty bomb — or radiological dispersion bomb — is a relatively unsophisticated device that combines radioactive materials with conventional explosives. When exploded, such a device scatters radioactive particles into the environment. No nuclear-fission reaction takes place as would occur with a true nuclear weapon, and, while anyone within the initial blast radius will probably be killed immediately, more casualties would probably result from the long-term effects of the dispersed radioactive material. According to Michael Levi, the physicist who managed a Federation of American Scientists’ (FAS) study into the effects of a dirty bomb explosion, protecting yourself after such an attack is a matter of getting indoors, showering, and not eating contaminated food or breathing open air. As he put it: “It’s really a matter of closing your windows and waiting for instructions.”
This is all to say that while nuclear proliferation is a serious concern - one that the Bush Administration or John McCain hasn’t taken seriously - it’s silly to get ourselves worked up over the possibility of an attack. Next time, Jeffrey Goldberg ought to think twice before posting such useless, fear-mongering garbage.